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Abstract
When the Soviet Union collapsed a transition process started in Eastern Europe. This
included a number of reforms to adapt the educational system to the new requirements of
the job market. To assess the educational systems in Eastern Europe, this paper takes a
look at the gap in PISA test scores between di￿erent countries. Using PISA 2006 data we
disentangle the e￿ects that explain the gap between Finland, the best performing country,
and seven Eastern European countries, as well as, between Eastern European countries.
The methodology applied in this paper is a semiparametric version of the threefold Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition, an approach which is not yet used in the research regarding the
di￿erences in school outcomes.
Our results show that in all cases the di￿erences in characteristics does not explain much
of the gap. The return e￿ect is the driving force of the di￿erences in test scores. Under
our identifying assumption, our results therefore indicate that the PISA test score gap
can mainly be attributed to the di￿erent e￿ciency of school systems and are not due to
better characteristics of students in a particular country. Furthermore, we provide evidence
that the gap is smaller for better students indicating that, especially for poor performing
students, the e￿ciency of Eastern European schools is behind the e￿ciency of Finnish
schools.
JEL classi￿cation: J24, I21, C14
Keywords: PISA, test score gap, decomposition, semiparametric, propensity score matching
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Over the past twenty years the countries of Eastern Europe have gone through periods of transi-
tion and structural changes which also a￿ected the educational system. Most Eastern European
countries have performed reforms to adapt the educational system to the new requirements of
the job market. One aim of these reforms was to improve the quality of schooling, which is
the driving force for the economic growth (Hanushek and Kimko (2000)). The success of these
reforms in education can be assessed by analyzing the results of international standardized
test scores such as PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), TIMSS (Third
International Mathematics and Science Study), or PIRLS (Progress in International Reading
Literacy Study). The results from PISA 2006, for example, show that there is a high variation
in performance of the Eastern European countries. Many of the Eastern European countries
are still in a transition process and have not yet overcome the initial disadvantages compared
to Western countries. Most of them perform statistically signi￿cantly below the OECD average
and only Estonia, Slovenia and Czech Republic perform in the upper part of the distribution
(OECD (2007)).
The ￿rst aim of this paper is to analyze the PISA test score gaps between Finland and seven
Eastern European countries (Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and
Slovakia). Using data from the 2006 survey, we choose Finland as benchmark for our analysis.
It is the best performing country in the PISA study and is considered to have the most e￿ective
and equitable school system (Ammerm￿ller (2007)). Understanding the test score di￿erences is
of huge importance since it allows improving the school systems and, therefore, directly provides
relevant information for educational policies.
The second aim is to disentangle the PISA test score gap between countries which had
similar educational systems 20 years ago. Estonia as well as Latvia belonged to the Soviet
Union until 1991, the Czech and Slovak Republic together formed Czechoslovakia until the end
of 1992. The precondition that two countries belonged to the same country forms a natural
experiment, that reveals how two countries, which start from more or less the same point,
develop over the subsequent years.
To achieve the two aims, we disentangle the e￿ects that explain the gaps in order to show
which factors contribute to the di￿erences in school performance. This enables us to answer
the following questions: Could institutional reforms improve the school performance and over-
come the disadvantages resulting from an unfavorable social background? Given the same
socio-economic background, which educational system manages to increase the returns to these
individual characteristics? Will a student perform better if, given his socio-cultural background,
he would attend the school system of a country that on average performs better than that of his
home country? In other words, how would school performance change if students from Eastern
Europe participated in the Finnish school system?
This paper contributes to the previous literature in several ways: First of all, it makes an
original contribution by introducing a semiparametric method into the educational literature,
which is commonly used in explaining the gender di￿erences in wages, but not in the research
1regarding the decomposition of di￿erences school outcomes. This is important in its own right
since recent papers have demonstrated that the functional form assumptions of the parametric
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) decomposition can give misleading results (Barsky, Bound,
Charles, and Lupton (2002), Mora (2008)). The methodology applied here is a semiparametric
version of the threefold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition which disentangles the e￿ects in an
endowment, return and an interaction e￿ect between these two. The method is based on an
approach proposed by Fr￿lich (2007), who uses propensity score matching to compute the
counterfactual outcome. To account for di￿erences in the common support we further follow
the procedure developed by ￿opo (2008). Furthermore, this is the ￿rst paper that decomposes
the di￿erences in PISA test scores between the best performing country in the study and several
Eastern European countries as well as between some Eastern European countries.
The reminder of the paper is the following: The next section provides a general overview
of the educational systems in Eastern Europe. The second section focuses on the identi￿cation
strategy used to decompose the gap in school performance. The third section presents the
PISA study 2006 and describes the data. Section 4 discusses the estimation results and section
5 takes a closer look at the unexplained part of the total gap. The last section concludes.
2 Overview of the Educational Systems in Eastern Europe
According to Cerych (1997) and Rad￿ (2001) the following issues of the educational reforms
in Eastern Europe can be identi￿ed: In all countries, a depolitisation of education took place,
implying the end of ideological control and orientation of the system. Furthermore, educational
change led to the decentralization and liberalization in educational management by breaking
down the state monopoly. Another issue of the reforms was rede￿ning the quality in education.
During communism, the most important indicators for quality was the participation rates and
the achievement of the most talented students (Rad￿ (2001)). The new reforms instead focused
on the quality of curricula and exams, on the improvement of the in-service training of the
teachers, as well as on the speci￿c learning interests of pupils. Aside from the problem of
￿nancing of education, another issue of the reforms was that of equity. In the old system, the
tracking of students in vocational, technical and general schools, as well as the institutionalized
segregation of disabled and minority children (Roma, for example) deepened the inequalities in
the education system, which were then re￿ected on the labor market and in society.
Even if these countries started reforms at the same time, their subsequent evolution was
di￿erent, depending, especially, on the development and the speed of economic reforms. Look-
ing, for example, at countries such as Estonia, Czech Republic and Hungary, that went through
a process of rapid privatization (Bjłrnskov and Potrafke (2011)), they are also those countries
that are among Eastern European countries the best performing in PISA test scores. Thus,
with few exceptions, we cannot speak of continuity in educational reforms as long as they de-
pend on factors outside the system itself. Only in the case of Hungary and Estonia there were
undivided educational policies, due to measures taken before 1989. In Hungary, the decentral-
ization of the educational system had already started in 1985 (Rad￿ (2001)). The Estonian
2schools already won a degree of autonomy regarding the content of curricula during the Soviet
period when textbooks were predominantly written by Estonian authors (Kitsing (2008)).
As culture has an impact on institutions and economic outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2006)), we should also mention the heterogeneity in the cultural and historical back-
grounds in order to explain the di￿erent evolution of the educational reforms in Eastern Europe.
Our sample consists of Romania and Bulgaria from South-Eastern Europe, Hungary, Czech
and Slovak Republic from the Visegrad group and Estonia and Latvia from the Baltic re-
gion. Romania and Bulgaria are traditionally Orthodox Christian with some Islamic in￿uence.
Economically and educationally, they mainly developed after World War II. In comparison,
Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republic are historically of Roman Christian culture and devel-
oped economically and educationally much earlier. The two Baltic Republics, on the other
hand, are historically in￿uenced by Germany and Russia. Since their independence in the early
1990’s, they have close contact with Scandinavian countries. Their current educational systems
therefore combine Nordic and Central European characteristics (Cerych (1997)).
Generally, previous empirical research on the school performance of the Eastern European
countries is quite limited, providing mixed results and inconclusive evidence. One reason was
the lack of reliable data that can objectively describe the educational process in these countries.
Before 1989, data reported on human capital stock (years of schooling, for example) were over-
estimated (Beirne and Campos (2007)) and, after 1989, the participation at the international
standardized tests (TIMSS, PIRLS, PISA) was not the same for all countries. Estonia, for
example, participated for the ￿rst time in the PISA Study in 2006. The existence of such
comparative data and of cross-national individual-level survey has allowed in the last years
the extension of research, promising to answer key questions concerning the quality of the
educational system in Eastern Europe.
For the transition period, the paper by Ammerm￿ller, Heijke, and W￿￿mann (2005) provides
evidence regarding the production of school quality in Eastern European countries. Even if these
countries faced similar characteristics in the economic and political development, the impact
of individual factors, school resources and institutional settings on school performance shows
di￿erent patterns. Using TIMSS data from 1995, the authors show that the student background
has a lower impact in those countries which perform worse (Lithuania, Latvia and Romania)
and which adopted reforms regarding the school system later than the other countries. The
largest e￿ects are obtained in Czech Republic and Hungary. The impact of school resources
and teacher characteristics on school performance is low in magnitude and does not necessarily
indicate a particular pattern. Only in some cases (Romania, Czech Republic and Hungary), a
better training and a richer experience of the teachers can positively in￿uence the test scores.
The most favorable institutional setting is in Czech Republic, although the results show that
the variation in test scores cannot be explained by institutional di￿erences between countries.
All in all, Ammerm￿ller, Heijke, and W￿￿mann (2005) show substantial e￿ects of student
background on educational performance and much lower impact of resources and institutional
settings.
3One of the e￿orts of the educational reforms in Eastern Europe was to adjust the edu-
cational systems to the new labor market conditions. In this sense, the literature has also
attempted to estimate returns to schooling in di￿erent transition economies. Flabbi, Pater-
nostro, and Tiongson (2008) analyze a sample of eight countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) over the early transition pe-
riod up to 2002. Using data from the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme), they
test if the transition to a market economy leads to higher returns of schooling and ￿nd a weak
empirical evidence in this sense. Large cross-country variation could be identi￿ed only in the
levels of returns to schooling. They classify the countries in the following three groups. Hun-
gary and Poland exhibit high levels of returns to schooling, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovenia as well
as Russia ￿medium￿ returns of schooling and Czech and Slovak Republic low returns.
3 Identi￿cation Strategy
Understanding the di￿erences in school achievement is one of the central themes in economics
of education. The analysis of disparities in school performance are focused either on the gender
gap in di￿erent subjects (Fryer and Levitt (2010), Niederle and Vesterlund (2010)), on the dif-
ferences between countries (McEwan and Marshall (2004), Ammerm￿ller (2007)), and between
di￿erent subgroups (Card and Rothstein (2007), Patacchini and Zenou (2009), Krieg and Storer
(2006), Duncan and Sandy (2007), Schneeweis (2010)).
All of these studies use a parametric approach and most of them used the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition or a modi￿ed parametric version of it. The traditional Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
position determines the source of the di￿erences at the means and breaks down a gap into
two parts by estimating one counterfactual. The ￿rst part, the characteristics e￿ect, can be
explained by the di￿erences in the characteristics of individuals and the second part, commonly
known as the unexplained gap, is a structure e￿ect, which re￿ects the di￿erences in slope coef-
￿cients. A comprehensive overview of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is provided by Fortin,
Lemieux, and Firpo (2010). The main disadvantages of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
are the ignorance of the common-support problems and the functional form assumptions. To
avoid these drawbacks, we apply a semiparametric method, which makes it possible to identify
the counterfactual outcome for every individual separately, allowing for arbitrary individual
e￿ect heterogeneity (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Imbens (2004)). Moreover, the
counterfactual outcomes are only computed for those individuals who are actually comparable.
This semiparametric method identi￿es the counterfactual outcome for each individual as
it is done in the evaluation literature. There, the interest usually lies in the estimation of
the e￿ect of a program. To isolate the true e￿ect of the program on a particular individual,
the observed outcome has to be compared to the outcome that would have resulted had the
individual not been treated (not participated in the program). To estimate this counterfactual
outcome, information on the non-participants is used. One possibility is to match treatment
with comparison units that are similar in terms of their observable characteristics. Generally,
matching directly on the vector of characteristics would be computationally demanding and,
4due to the curse of dimensionality, it would become hard to ￿nd good matches if the number
of covariates is large.
To overcome this problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that matching can
be done on a single-index variable, namely the propensity score. Fr￿lich (2007) is the ￿rst who
uses such a matching procedure outside the treatment evaluation literature. He shows that
mean independence is su￿cient for consistency of propensity score matching and uses it to
decompose the gender wage gap between those who are on the common support analogously
to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition into a characteristics and return e￿ect. In this paper, we
will extend this procedure to estimate a threefold decomposition.
To obtain the propensity score, we estimate the probability that an individual belongs to
the better performing country (D = 1) by a logit regression, i.e.
p = Pr[D = 1jX = x] = F (x
0)
where F (x0) represents the cumulative logistic distribution. In the next step, the density of
this propensity score is estimated using a Gaussian Kernel estimator. Kernel matching then
uses all members of one group to generate a match for each observation in the other group.
Thereby, the contribution of each member is determined by the bandwidth and is smaller, the
poorer the match is. The bandwidths are selected by leave-one-out cross-validation and are
chosen to minimize the least-squares criterion. Let f1(p) be the distribution of the propensity
score p = p(X) among those from country D = 1 (the better performing country), f0(p) the
distribution among those pupils from country D = 0 (the worse performing country) and fS
d (p),
for d = 0;1, the density of p in the subpopulation of those from country D = d belonging to the
common support, S, of the two countries.1 In such a way, the test score gap for the common
support subpopulation
S = ES[Y
1jD = 1]   ES[Y
0jD = 0]




E[Y jp(x) = p;D = 1]f
S
1 (p) dp  
Z
S
E[Y jp(x) = p;D = 0]f
S
0 (p)
Since the decomposition is only for the common support subpopulation, the overlap assumption
is always ful￿lled and the only identifying assumption is mean independence given x, e.g. if
E[Y jD = 0;X = x] = E[Y jD = 1;X = x] holds Fr￿lich (2007) shows that the counterfactual
outcomes is identi￿ed by estimating
ES[Y
1jD = 0] =
Z
S
E[Y jp(x) = p;D = 1]f
S
0 (p) dp and
ES[Y
0jD = 1] =
Z
S






SjD=d is scaled such that the integral integrates to one. Thereby, SjD=d is the empirical proba-
bility of being on the common support conditional on being from country d.
5where the counterfactual outcome for p(x) = p can be estimated by the Nadaraya-Watson
estimator
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Thereby, K is the kernel function, h the bandwidth, nd the number of observations and pd
the propensity score of those in country d. The ￿rst counterfactual ES[Y 1jD = 0] gives the
expected outcome those from country D = 0 would have in country D = 1.2 In section 4, we
will argue why the assumption of mean independence given x is reasonable in our analysis.
In order to disentangle the e￿ects of the gap, we extend the procedure applied by Fr￿lich
(2007) by decomposing the gap into three parts:
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In terms of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the ￿rst term can be attributed to di￿erences
in the distributions of individual characteristics (over the common support) and is, therefore,
the characteristics e￿ect (c). It captures the di￿erence of the test scores that would vanish
if the characteristics of the students from the worse performing country would follow the same
distribution as those of the students from the better performing country. The second summand
is the part of the gap (over the common support) that can be explained by those factors, other
than individual characteristics, that determine the school performance (institutional aspects
of the school system, resources, cultural factors). It would vanish if the students from the
worse performing country would attend the school system of the better performing country and
thus is analogous to the return e￿ect (r) in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The term
in the last brackets (cr) is the interaction e￿ect between the characteristics and the return
e￿ect, re￿ecting the fact that the gap could also be determined by the simultaneous existence
of di￿erences in the distributions of individual characteristics and in the returns.
2Note that the problem of self-selection does not occur in our context as the treatment is the attendance of
a school system in another country. Since we only use natives and second generation immigrants, this cannot
be in￿uenced by the individuals.
6We decide to apply the threefold decomposition, used for the ￿rst time in decomposing the
gap in test score by Ammerm￿ller (2007), for the following reason. When we have to decompose
a gap in test score, we should take into account that individuals can be better endowed with
characteristics that, at the same time, are better rewarded by their school systems than by the
other school system. In our case, the interaction term (if positive) expresses how much better
the students from the worse performing country would score on average if the students from
the better performing country did not have the advantage of being better endowed with those
characteristics that are also better rewarded in terms of test scores in their country, or less
endowed with those characteristics that are better rewarded in the worse performing country.
Since, in this study, we want to identify the PISA test score gap of all individuals from two
country and not just the gap of those who are on the common support, we also need to account
for individuals whose distributions of the propensity score do not overlap.
To account for the fact that some of the observations in the sample cannot be matched,
￿opo (2008) suggests ￿rst decomposing the observed average test score of both countries into
a part that is due to those who are on the common support (S) and into a part resulting from
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for d = 0;1 and where  SjD=d is the empirical probability of being unmatched conditional on
being from country d. In order to obtain expressions involving expected values conditional on
the respective partitioned domains, the integrals are rescaled. If we use these expressions to
calculate the PISA score gap , we get
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Like in (1), the second part of this expression, which represents the gap for the common
support subpopulation, can again be disentangled into three parts. Therefore, the whole gap
 is disentangled into ￿ve parts, i.e.
 = 1 + c + r + cr + 0
7Additionally to the characteristics, return and interaction e￿ect, we get two terms which
make up the part of the gap that can be explained by di￿erences between two groups of
pupils from the countries, those whose characteristics can be matched to pupils from the other
country and those who cannot. Using this method for decomposing PISA test score gaps, it is
ensured that we look separately at those individuals who actually have comparable background
characteristics and those who do not. Each of the ￿ve components of the total gap can be
interpreted as follows:
 1 represents the gap in test scores that can be explained by di￿erences between those
students from the better performing country who can be matched to students from the
other country and those who remain out of the common support, weighted by the empirical
fraction of those who are out of common support from the better performing country. A
positive value of the gap indicates that the students from the better performing country,
who are out-of-support, perform better than their counterparts, who are on the common
support.
 0 describes the gap in test scores that can be explained by di￿erences between those
students from the worse performing country who cannot be matched and those who are on
the common support, weighted by the empirical fraction of those who are out of common
support from the worse performing country.
 c, r and cr represent the characteristics, return and interaction e￿ect computed only
for the common support subpopulation and were described above.
Compared to the parametric Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the approach applied here
di￿ers in the following aspects. The regression function is not speci￿ed as linear and the
counterfactual scores are simulated only for the common support subpopulation. In the case
of Blinder-Oaxaca, the regressions are performed for all students, extrapolating the validity of
the counterfactuals also for those individuals out of the common support.
Since we estimate the e￿ects for every individual, another advantage of the semiparamteric
approach is that we can identify the e￿ects at di￿erent quantiles . Therefore, we estimate the
￿ve parts as follows:






























































The following analysis is based on data from PISA 2006. PISA assesses the achievement of
15-year-olds in mathematics, reading and science literacy. Apart from test scores, data on
pupils’ social and cultural background were collected as well as information about the school
environment of students OECD (2007).
The data contain information on more than 35 000 students and more than 2000 schools.
For comparison reasons, the scores have been standardized to a mean of 500 and a standard
deviation of 100. Our sample consists of data from Finland and seven Eastern European coun-
tries: Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovakia. A general
description of the variables used in this study is given in Table (1). Since the performance of
the immigrants from the ￿rst-generation could also re￿ect the in￿uence of other school sys-
tems than the one they currently attend, we decide to drop these students from the samples.
Moreover, the share of ￿rst generation immigrants is quite di￿erent for the countries in our
sample.
[Table (1) about here]
Having to deal with a high volume of data, the problem of missing data in PISA study
is inevitable. As Ammerm￿ller (2007) noted, dropping individuals with missing information
could lead to an upward bias in test scores, since the missing data are not missing at random,
being predominant among students who have low test scores. One solution to overcoming this
problem is to predict the values of these data using the complete information available from all
students. Thus, we decide to impute all the missing values by applying a method suggested by
W￿￿mann, L￿demann, Sch￿tz, and West (2009).
Table (2) presents the weighted means and standard deviations for the variables used in our
study.
[Table (2) about here]
To apply propensity score matching, we only use data at the individual level. These include
measures for the students’ characteristics (age, gender and grade) and for family background
(number of books at home, parents’ education). Furthermore, these variables are commonly
used to measure the (in)equality of educational opportunities (W￿￿mann (2008), Sch￿tz, Ur-
sprung, and W￿ssmann (2008), Martins and Veiga (2010)). From these indicators, the number
of books is the most important measure of family background, which best predicts the student
performance (W￿￿mann (2003), Fuchs and W￿￿mann (2007), W￿￿mann (2008)). Therefore,
we expect that the di￿erences in these observable characteristics of the students from di￿erent
countries explain the gap in their school performance being con￿dent that the mean indepen-
dence assumption holds in our analysis.
According to Sch￿tz, Ursprung, and W￿ssmann (2008), there is a high variation across
school systems as to what extent they achieve equal opportunities for children from di￿erent
9family backgrounds. Their results, as well as those from PISA (OECD (2007)), con￿rm the fact
that from Europe, Finland has the most equitable school system. Using these variables that
describe the family background and which are important determinants of school performance
to match the Finnish students with those from countries from Eastern Europe, we can regard
the di￿erences in school performance in such matched groups as unexplained by individual and
background characteristics. In this way, we intend to measure precisely how much of the total
gap to Finland can be explained by di￿erences in the distributions of observable individual
characteristics and how much can be explained by other factors, such as school resources and
di￿erent institutional features of the school system.
We decide not to include school variables in obtaining the propensity score for the following
two main reasons. First of all, the matches become poor when including school or country
variables. Secondly, by matching on individual characteristics, the resulting estimate of the
counterfactual outcome represents the conditional probability that an individual with propen-
sity score p would, for example, attend a comprehensive school, a private school or a class with
less than 20 pupils. To our understanding, this is of interest and not what an individual would
have in the other country if he/she would attend exactly the school type and class design he/she
attends in his/her home country.
The descriptive statistics reported in Table (2) show some di￿erences in observable charac-
teristics between students from di￿erent countries. Looking at the grade in which students are,
reveals the fact that in Finland, Estonia and Latvia most of the students from the sample are
in the 9th grade and the percentage of those being in the 10th or 11th class is below 3 percent.
In Czech and Slovak Republic most of the students are in the 10th grade and in Estonia, more
than a quarter of the students are in 8th grade, while in Bulgaria, Czech and Slovak Republic
the percentage is below 7. Regarding the number of books, more than a third of students from
Bulgaria and Romania have less than 50 books at home, while the corresponding percentage
in the other countries is between 16 and 20. In all countries, the parents are well educated,
but some di￿erences can still be noticed. In Finland, the majority of the parents have a ter-
tiary education whereas the majority in the Eastern European countries have upper secondary
education. Among the Eastern European countries, the parents in Czech and Slovak Republic
are best educated. In both countries, more than 75 percent of the students have parents who
completed upper secondary education.
As mentioned before, we mainly analyze the gap in school performance between Finland
and countries from Eastern Europe in this paper. According to data from Table (2), the range
of di￿erences in test scores is very large: between 152 points (Finland - Romania in reading)
and 32 points (Finland - Estonia in science). Also the spread of the test scores in countries from
Eastern Europe is very di￿erent: higher in Bulgaria and in Czech Republic, lower in Estonia,
Latvia and Romania.
Regarding the di￿erences in the supports, we present in Table (3) the fractions of individuals,
whose combinations of age, gender, grade, number of books and parents’ education cannot be
matched.
10[Table (3) about here]
It can be seen that for 14 of the 18 cases less than 3 percent of the students are out of the
common support. Nevertheless, for the decompositions between Finland and Hungary, Bulgaria,
Czech as well as Slovak Republic, 15.39% to 49.74% of the students cannot be matched with
pupils from Finland.3 In all country comparisons at least 98.51% of Finnish students are on
the common support and therefore as comparison units available.
5 Estimation Results
To estimate the di￿erent components of the PISA test score gap, we include all individual
variables explained above. Since the estimation results are similar for math and science from
the point of view of the magnitude and sign e￿ects, we only report the science results. All
of our decompositions are formulated from the point of view of the worse performing country
(D = 0).
Results for the Decompositions of the Science score gaps between Finland and
Eastern European countries
Table (4) shows the results of the semiparametric decompositions for the science PISA test
scores between Finland and seven Eastern European countries.
[Table (4) about here]
The ￿rst striking result is that, for all seven countries, the return e￿ect is signi￿cantly
positive and the e￿ect with the largest magnitude. This indicates that, given their average
characteristics, the students from each of the seven Eastern European countries would have on
average higher test scores in science if they attended the Finnish school system. Particularly the
pupils from Bulgaria and Romania would pro￿t from a such school system; making it possible
to increase their score in science by more than 100 points on average.
The characteristics e￿ect is smaller in magnitude and only signi￿cant for six country com-
parisons. The characteristics e￿ect is not signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero between Finland and
Czech Republic. It is positive for four countries. This reveals that the Finnish students tend to
have slightly more favorable characteristics than the students from Eastern European countries
on average. Only when we compare Finland with Hungary and Slovak Republic are the stu-
dents’ characteristics from these two worse performing countries actually more advantageous
than the characteristics of the Finnish students. In these cases, the interaction e￿ect is also high
relative to the corresponding total gap, showing that the gap would be smaller if the Finnish
students had not the advantage of being better endowed with those characteristics which are
also better rewarded by the Finnish school system compared to the other school system.
3The reason for these shares is that, in these countries, the fraction of those in grade 10 or 11 is relatively
high, whereas this number is nearly zero in Finland. This leads to an almost perfect predictor in the logit
regression and, therefore, to more propensity scores out of the common support.
11Analyzing the values of 0, we notice that the di￿erences in the average test scores between
those who are on the common support and those who are out of the common support is
signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero only for the comparison of Finland with the Czech Republic and
Hungary. In these cases, this e￿ect matters even more than the di￿erences in the characteristics
for explaining the total gap. The negative values of 0 show that the students from the worse
performing countries who are out of the common support score signi￿cantly higher in the PISA
science test score than those who are on the common support. This negative e￿ect can again
be explained by the fact that, in these countries, we obtained a sizeable share of pupils in grade
10 or 11. As described before, those pupils are more likely to be out of common support but,
since they are older (e.g. had more schooling), their scores are on average higher in the PISA
tests. The magnitude of 1 on the other hand is negligible and insigni￿cant in all cases.
The result of the comparison between Finland and the Czech Republic also illustrates the
importance of controlling for those who are out of the common support. If we would have
looked at the common support subpopulation only, the gap in the average science test score
would be 67.9 instead of 51.35 and therefore over 30% larger than the actual gap of the whole
sample.
All in all and under our identifying assumption, our estimation results suggest that the
higher average score in science in Finland is mainly due to the fact that the Finnish school
system is more e￿cient in transforming the given inputs into PISA test score points.
Results for the Decompositions of the Reading score gaps between Finland and
Eastern European countries
Table (5) contains the results for the PISA reading scores.
[Table (5) about here]
It can be seen that, except for the comparison of Finland and Latvia, the gaps for reading
scores are larger than the gaps for the science results. Moreover, the results yield more or less
the same interpretation as the results for the PISA science test scores. Again, all return e￿ects
are signi￿cantly positive and by far the largest in magnitude in explaining the majority part
of the gap. Like in the decomposition of the science test scores, the characteristics e￿ect are
only negative for Hungary and Slovak Republic. For the other ￿ve countries, the characteristics
e￿ect is positive indicating that, on average, the Finnish students are slightly better endowed
with more favorable characteristics or less endowed with less favorable characteristics. For the
reading scores, four of the interaction e￿ects are signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero. All of them
are positive and suggest that the Finnish students have a slight advantage due to the fact that
they are better endowed with those characteristics that also yield a higher return in Finland.
The values for 1 are again all around zero and insigni￿cantly di￿erent from zero. Like for the
PISA science test score gap, the values of 0 are signi￿cantly negative for Hungary as well as
the Czech and Slovak Republic, indicating again that the students from those countries, who
12cannot be matched with Finnish students, score on average higher in the PISA reading test
than their counterparts who can be matched. As before, we attribute this to the fact that those
who are out of the common support obtained more schooling by the time of the test.
Results for the Decompositions of the Science and Reading score gaps among East-
ern European countries
As indicated before, the results from PISA study show that there is a signi￿cant variation in
the performance, not only between Finland and Eastern European countries, but also between
countries from Eastern Europe, which shared the same educational system for decades. We refer
here to Czech and Slovak Republic as well as Estonia and Latvia. Since each pair of countries
also share a common history with respect to their religion, culture and the in￿uence of other
countries, we expect them to be more similar than the students in the previous decompositions.
Given these considerations, it is interesting to have a look at the gap of each of these two pair
of countries that were more common twenty years ago but have developed di￿erently since the
early 1990’s, in order to explain their di￿erent evolution over time in terms of test scores at
PISA study. The decomposition results are presented in Tables (6) and (7).
[Table (6) about here]
[Table (7) about here]
As we expected, the characteristics e￿ects are not signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero in both
cases, indicating that the distributions of the individual propensity scores are very similar in
each of these two pair of countries.
In both cases, almost the whole gap can be explained by the return e￿ect. While for the
decomposition gap between Estonia and Latvia the interaction e￿ect is very small and insignif-
icant, in case of Czech and Slovak Republic the magnitude of this e￿ect is not negligible and
works in favor of Slovak students. Even if the students from Czech Republic have the advantage
of higher returns, they are less endowed with those characteristics that are better rewarded by
their school system than by the Slovak system or more endowed with those characteristics that
are better rewarded by the Slovak school system, as re￿ected by the negative values of the
interaction e￿ects.
Due to the similar distribution of the propensity score, the matching procedure works well
for all individuals from the two compared countries. As can be seen in Table for more than
99.73% comparison units are available. This result also explains the fact that 1 and 0 have
no contribution in explaining the total gap.
13Results for the Semiparametric Decompositions of the Science and Reading score
gaps at di￿erent quantiles
In this part we will focus on the gaps of the PISA test score at di￿erent quantiles instead of
the mean.
Table (8) presents the results for the science test scores, showing that the distributions of
the gaps are quite di￿erent for various country comparisons.
[Table (8) about here]
The course of the total gap shows di￿erent patterns. For some countries’ comparisons
(Finland-Estonia, Finland-Hungary and Finland-Romania), it increases in the lower part of the
distribution up to 25th or 50th percentile and then decreases more or less for the rest part of the
distribution. When we compare Finland-Czech Republic and Finland-Bulgaria the total gap
in science is the highest for the ￿rst percentile (p5) and then decreases steadily until the last
percentile (p95). The opposite pattern is found in the case of Czech-Slovak Republic, where the
total gap is the smallest at the ￿rst percentile ( p5) and then increases steadily along the whole
distribution. The decomposition results for Finland-Estonia and Finland-Latvia show that the
total gap is relatively stable along the distribution.
Looking at the evolution of the characteristics e￿ect at di￿erent quantiles, it can be noticed
that, in all nine cases, the e￿ect is negative for at least the last two quantiles. This reveals
that for the high performing students, the characteristics of the students from worse performing
countries are in fact more advantageous than those of the students from the better performing
country. From the median to the lowest part of the distribution, the characteristics e￿ect
increases steadily in most cases (except for Finland-Czech Republic and Finland-Hungary),
showing that the weaker students perform, the more disadvantageous are their characteristics
relative to those of the students from Finland, at the respective percentile.
In all nine decompositions, the return e￿ect decreases over the whole distribution. Except
for the decomposition between Finland and Romania, the return e￿ect even becomes negative
at the 95% quantile. These results reveal the fact that, for weaker students, the respective
school system in Eastern Europe is less able to convert the endowments of the students into a
good performance compared to the school system of the better performing country. In other
words, these students, given their characteristics, would perform better in science if they would
attend the other school system. For high performing students this is di￿erent. For them,
their school systems better succeed in transforming the students’ characteristics into a good
educational achievement, than could the reference school systems of the better performing
countries. These results show that those countries who are better performing on average (e.g.
in our decompositions Finland, Estonia and Czech) are better because they are better able to
convert the given characteristics of the poor performing students into relatively high scores and
not because they get the best out of the very good performing students.
The interaction e￿ect increases steadily, being positive from about the 75 percent quantile
upwards. The magnitude of this e￿ect is very high, having a great in￿uence on the total gap
14size at each quantile. At the lower part of the test score distribution, we observe the same
pattern: The characteristics and return e￿ects are generally positive, while the interaction ef-
fect is always negative. This result shows that the total gap at these quantiles would have
been higher if the students from the better performing country would not be less endowed with
those characteristics that are better rewarded by their school system as by the less performing
system. Looking at the upper quantile, we notice that even if the characteristics and return
e￿ects are negative, the total gap turns positive due to the magnitude of the interaction e￿ects.
It thus shows, that, even if the characteristics of the students from the worse performing coun-
tries are more advantageous and the school system, that they attend, succeeds in transforming
these characteristics into a good school performance, the advantage of the students from the
better performing country is much higher, as re￿ected by the sign and magnitude of the inter-
action e￿ect. These students are better endowed with those characteristics that are also better
rewarded by their school system, generating higher test scores.
Analyzing the gaps in science between the students from the worse performing country who
cannot be matched and those who can be matched (0) at di￿erent quantiles it can be noticed
that, especially for those cases where the share of the observations out of the common support
is relatively high, the gaps increase more or less over the distribution, but remain negative and
relatively stable in magnitude. If we again attribute this gap to the fact that the those in grade
10 or 11 are out of common support this result indicates that in the group of those who are
out of the common support (e.g. the older group) the best students perform better than the
outstanding students from the lower grades.
Table (9) displays the decomposition of the gaps at di￿erent quantiles for the reading test
score.
[Table (9) about here]
Compared to the results presented above for the science test score gaps, the decompositions
at di￿erent quantiles for the reading score reveal signi￿cant di￿erences. On the one hand, the
total gap in reading is smaller than the total gap in science at the upper part, and much higher
at the lower part of the distribution. On the other hand, the di￿erences in gaps between the
two extremes of the distribution (p5-p95) are higher for the reading as for the science test score.
Thus, these results show that there is a higher heterogeneity in students’ performance not only
between students from di￿erent countries at the respective percentile, but also along the same
distribution of the reading test scores.
Compared to the science test scores gap, the course of the total gap in reading test scores
is the same for all country comparisons between Finland and the seven Eastern European
countries. For all these countries, the gap is decreasing from the ￿rst percentile to the end of
upper part of the distribution. This result gives further insight as to why the Finnish students
perform best in the PISA 2006 study. The Finnish school achieves that the poor performing
students perform much better than the poor performing students of the other countries. If we
look at the comparison between Estonia and Latvia, as well as, Czech and Slovak Republic, we
15￿nd this pattern only for the ￿rst pair. In the case of Czech and Slovak Republic, the total gap
is smallest in the lower part of the distribution and then increases steadily.
The characteristics e￿ect decreases steadily from the ￿rst to the last percentile. As in the
case of the science score gaps, the e￿ect is negative only at the upper part of the distribution.
The course of the return e￿ect for reading is similar to the return e￿ect in science test score,
with the distinction that it remains positive, not only when we compare the test scores between
Finland and Romania, but also in the case of Finland-Bulgaria. The Romanian and Bulgarian
school systems are less e￿cient in transforming the advantage that the best performing students
are better endowed into higher test scores. Compared to the other Eastern European countries,
which achieve higher returns in the upper part of the distribution than Finland, they are still less
e￿cient than the Finnish school system. Like in the science test score results, the interaction
e￿ect increases steadily, being here positive from about the 75 percent quantile upwards.
The evolution of the gaps at di￿erent quantiles between the students from the worse per-
forming country who cannot be matched and those who are on the common support, show
similar patterns as the science test scores gaps.
6 Understanding the unexplained part of test score gap
As our results show, the unexplained part is the largest in explaining the total test score gap.
Therefore, we show that the individual characteristics we use to estimate the propensity score
are not the main driving force of the di￿erences in PISA test scores, e.g. evidence is provided
that those from the better performing country are not just better endowed with more favorable
characteristics. Even though this result contributes to understanding the di￿erences in school
performance, it does not provide information about what makes the di￿erence. One possibility
is to include further institutional and country speci￿c variables, but, as this would add almost
perfect predictors to the estimation of the propensity score, the matching procedure would no
longer appropriate since the common support area would shrink.
We do not think that controlling for these covariates would be appropriate, not only from a
methodical standpoint. Let’s consider that enough comparison units exists. If we would then
control for a certain school type, for example, those comparison units who are in the same
school type would be more likely to form the counterfactual outcome. Nevertheless, it might
be that, given his/her characteristics, this individual would not participate in this school type
in the other country but would be much more likely to visit another school type. If we match
only on the basis of individual characteristics, this conditional probability is re￿ected in the
obtained counterfactual outcome.
If our identifying assumption about the mean independence holds, there are no other in-
dividual confounders than those used to construct the propensity score. In this case, the
unexplained part is not due to unobserved individual characteristics and can be attributed to
the di￿erent school system. This section, therefore, is intended to provide a better insight into
the unexplained part of the gap.
According to the economic literature on educational achievement, other factors that in￿u-
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accountability measures, school autonomy, school tracking, and school inputs such as class size,
shortage of materials, school location, teacher education and instruction time. Thus, in order
to understand the magnitude of the unexplained part of the test score gap we should take
a closer look at di￿erent characteristics of the school systems considered in this study. This
comparative and descriptive approach also aims to provide an explicit view why we did not
include such variables in our matching procedure. We refer here to di￿erent aspects regarding
the design of the school systems, such as, the existence or nonexistence of certain educational
policies, the timing of implementation of certain measures designed to have long term e￿ects
and other issues, more or less adjacent to the educational act, which generally a￿ects the quality
of certain features of the educational system.
As mentioned before, in the case of Eastern European countries, the most important in-
stitutional features that have proven to a￿ect school outcomes (see W￿￿mann, L￿demann,
Sch￿tz, and West (2009), Hanushek and W￿￿mann (2010)), were also those that have under-
gone numerous reforms in educational policies over the past 20 years. One of these institutional
features is school autonomy. W￿￿mann, L￿demann, Sch￿tz, and West (2009) show that stu-
dents perform better in schools that have autonomy in hiring teachers, in budget allocation as
well as in choosing school textbooks and teaching methods. In Table (10), we look whether
the schools have autonomy with respect to hiring teachers, operating expenditures, content of
the compulsory minimum curriculum, the curricular content of optional subjects, the choice of
teaching method, the choice of school textbooks, criteria for internal assessment of pupils and
the decision whether pupils should repeat a class. As can be seen, the four best performing
countries in our sample are also those who have at least limited autonomy in all eight categories.
By comparison, we see that in Bulgaria and Romania, the school autonomy had not even been
implemented in 2005, the time when the PISA data collection for 2006 took place which might
explain a part of the large unexplained gap between Finland and these countries.
[Table (10) about here]
If we look at Estonia and Latvia, the unexplained gap can further be due to the fact that in
Estonia, for example, the autonomy in choosing school textbooks has a long tradition. Even
before 1990, Estonia refused to use teaching materials from other countries as the other Baltic
states did, preferring to teach from textbooks written by Estonian authors. We, therefore,
could presume that increasing the decision-making power regarding hiring teachers, operating
expenditures with salaries and choice of textbooks will have a positive impact on the school per-
formance of students from the worse performing countries and especially for those from Bulgaria
and Romania. However, this follows only from the descriptive part. As W￿￿mann, L￿demann,
Sch￿tz, and West (2009) show, a positive association between school autonomy and student
achievement is not automatically guaranteed, especially then when a high degree of asymmetric
information on school’s interests generates incentives for opportunistic behavior. We expect to
￿nd such behavior in countries (like in Bulgaria and Romania), where the quality of institutions
17(including schools) is a￿ected by corruption which, in turn, determines an unproductive use of
schooling (see Rogers (2008)). According to W￿￿mann, L￿demann, Sch￿tz, and West (2009),
the opportunistic behavior within schools can be controlled in those systems, where external
exams are implemented. Thus, monitoring schools and student performance through exami-
nations organized by external authorities, the positive impact of school autonomy on student
achievement counteracts the negative e￿ect of the opportunistic behavior.
Table (11) shows measures of the accountability of the school system for the countries in
our sample and reveals that the three least successful countries are those in which external
evaluation was implemented after 2000.
[Table (11) about here]
Another impact of the implementation of external examination is the indirect pressure exerted
on teachers and schools, whose performance is also evaluated in terms of results at these tests.
This creates a huge demand for investment in teacher training, especially in those countries
where the course contents must be changed and adapted to the new requirements. Table
(10) shows that the in-service training for teachers is compulsory in all countries except the
Slovak Republic. Therefore, we cannot state any association between the in-service training
for teachers and the PISA test scores. Moreover, the e￿ectiveness of these programs depends
entirely on their quality and on the way they cover the demand of training needed. However,
most of these in-service trainings in countries from Eastern Europe are still old-fashioned, being
organized within schools which are not fully reformed and which still feature many traits of the
old system (Rad￿ (2001)).
Moreover, there are some di￿erences between the unexplained gaps and some di￿erent quan-
titative patterns can be obtained. When we compare Estonia and Latvia, Czech and Slovak
Republic, as well as, Finland with Hungary or Czech Republic, the unexplained gap, both in
science and reading scores, is higher than the whole gap. Similarly, this is the case if we com-
pare Finland and Slovak Republic in reading scores. If the unexplained part is larger than the
whole gap, it can either re￿ect the fact that the students from the worse performing country,
who cannot be matched, obtain higher scores than their counterparts who are on the common
support (as in the case of Finland - Czech Republic, for example). In this case, 0 is negative
and the di￿erences in distributions of the individual characteristics literally do not explain any
of the total gap in the test scores. Alternatively, such a result can re￿ect more advantageous
individual and background characteristics of the students from the worse performing country
compared to Finnish students or it can be an interaction of these two e￿ects. This is the case
for the comparison of Finland and Hungary, for example. Here c and 0 are both signi￿cantly
negative and, therefore, the total gap is smaller than the unexplained part. In all these cases,
the students from the worse performing country who belong to the common support subpopu-
lation would, on average, even outperform the students from the better performing country if
they would attend their school system.
Looking at the magnitude of the unexplained gap along the percentiles, we notice the
same pattern for science and reading scores: This part of the gap is higher at the lower end
18of the test score distributions and then decreases steadily towards the upper end of the test
scores distributions. Comparing to the total gap, in the case of worse performing students,
the unexplained part of the gap surpasses the total gap at the respective quantile. Among
the best performing students, the unexplained gap decreases and it is even smaller in absolute
terms than the corresponding total gap, thus showing that, at the upper percentiles of the test
scores, the di￿erences in distributions of the individual and background characteristics explain
the total gap more than the unexplained gap.
7 Conclusion
The countries from Eastern Europe have gone through periods of transition, characterized by
a continuous reforming of the educational system, over the last 20 years . The aim of these
reforms was to adapt the school system to the educational standards of western Europe, as well
as, to the new labor market requirements.
This paper analyzes the di￿erences in PISA test scores between these countries and Finland,
which is considered to have the most e￿cient and equitable educational system in Europe, as
well as the di￿erences between countries, which had similar educational systems 20 years ago.
Understanding the test score di￿erences is of huge importance, since it allows improving the
school systems and, therefore, directly provides relevant information with respect to educational
policies. Thus, we contribute to the literature by showing where the di￿erence in PISA test
scores between Eastern European countries and Finland, the best performing country in the
PISA 2006 study, as well as among Eastern European countries come from.
Moreover, we contribute to the literature by introducing a semiparametric matching pro-
cedure into the educational literature. To decompose the gap in test scores, we use a method
which is based on an approach proposed by Fr￿lich (2007), who uses propensity score matching
to compute the counterfactual outcome. To account for di￿erences in the supports we further
follow the procedure developed by ￿opo (2008). Such a method relaxes the functional form
assumptions of the usual Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, often used to decompose the gap in
school performance, and illustrates the need to look at those individuals who have actually
comparable background characteristics and those who do not separately. In this paper we
extend this procedure to estimate a threefold decomposition.
Applying this method in decomposing the gaps in PISA test scores provides interesting
insights. We provide evidence that only a small part of the gap can be attributed to the fact
that the Finnish students are better endowed with more favorable individual characteristics.
The main part of the gap still remains after controlling for the individual background. If
our identifying assumption of mean independence holds, this remaining part of the gap is
an estimate of the potential gain the Eastern European students could obtain if they would
participate in the Finnish school system, or alternatively of their school system could approach
the Finnish one. The students from South Eastern Europe are those who have the largest
potential outcome increase if they would attend a school system similar to the Finnish one.
Estonia, the country which already adapted its school system to the Finnish school system
19more than any other country in our sample, would gain the least if they would adapt further
to the Finnish school system. Estonia not only performs best out of our Eastern European
countries but also among the best of all participating countries.
If we take a closer look at the distribution of the test score gaps in the science and reading
test score gap between each pair of the countries, we ￿nd that only for the comparison of the
science scores in Finland and Romania does the gap increase from the 5% quantile to the 95%
quantile. If we look at the science test score gap between Finland and the Baltic Republics,
we notice that the gap is more or less constant throughout the distribution. The striking
￿nding is that in 11 out of 14 comparisons, the gap decreases from the 5% quantile to the
95% quantile. This result clearly shows that the Finnish students are not, on average, the best
performing country because they manage to get the high performers to score better than the
high performers of the other countries but because their school system manages to have their
weakest students perform better than the weak students of the other countries. This clearly
points to very important policy advice to the Eastern European educational system; namely,
that they should not focus on the elite but rather on the weakest. Especially protruding is this
observation, if we look at the distribution of the reading test scores where in all seven cases,
the gap is decreasing from the 5% to the 95% quantile.
Moreover, our paper exploits the fact that some Eastern European countries have had a
very similar school system 20 years ago. Estonia and Latvia both belonged to the Soviet Union
and share a similar history and the Czech and Slovak Republic composed Czechoslovakia until
1992. This provides us with a situation similar to a natural experiment. In both cases, the
countries started from a very similar point but then developed di￿erently over the past years.
For these countries, we do not ￿nd any di￿erences in individual characteristics such that the
whole gap is due to the di￿erences in the educational systems. For both countries we even ￿nd
that the students from the country that score worse, on average, would even outperform the
students from the better performing country if all would attend the same school system. This
result holds independent of the subject.
If we look at the distribution of the gap, we ￿nd that it stays constant if we compare the
science test score between Estonia and Latvia, whereas it is decreasing if we focus on the reading
score. This indicates that, concerning reading, the poor performing Estonian students perform
better than the poor performing Latvia students, whereas the better performing students score
closer together in the two countries. Compared to that, we ￿nd that the gap is increasing over
the distribution for both subjects if we compare the Czech Republic to Slovakia. Hence, this
is the only pair of countries where the better performing country scores higher due to the fact
that the best performing students perform much better than the best performing students of
the worse performing country and the weak performing students from the better performing
country perform only slightly better than the weak performing students from the other country.
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23Tables
Table 1: Variables’ description
Variable Min Max Description Notation
Test scores
Reading score 5.67 781.96 mean of ￿ve plausible values for reading scorereading
Math score 40.61 819.05 mean of ￿ve plausible values for math scoremath
Science score 93.56 820.52 mean of ￿ve plausible values for science scorescience
Student Background
Student’s sex 0 1 1 for male Dmale
Student’s age 182.04 195.96 Student’s age in month age_m
7th grade 0 1 1 for 7th grade of students grade7
8th grade 0 1 1 for 8th grade of students grade8
9th grade 0 1 1 for 9th grade of students grade9
10th or 11th 0 1 1 for 10th or 11th grade of students grade1011
Books Cat.1 0 1 1 if less than 10 books at home book1
Books Cat.2 0 1 1 if 11-50 books book2
Books Cat.3 0 1 1 if 51-100 books book3
Books Cat.4 0 1 1 if 101-250 books book4
Books Cat.5 0 1 1 if 251-500 books book5
Books Cat.6 0 1 1 if more than 500 books book6
Mother’s no sec. Ed. 0 1 1 if completed at most ISCED 1 m_nosec
Mother’s lower sec. Ed. 0 1 1 if completed ISCED 2 m_lower_sec
Mother’s upper sec. Ed. 0 1 1 if completed ISCED 3A,3B,3C or 4 m_upper_sec
Mother’s tertiary Ed. 0 1 1 if completed ISCED 5B or higher m_ter
Father’s no sec. Ed. 0 1 1 if completed at most ISCED 1 f_nosec
Father’s lower sec. Ed. 0 1 1 if completed ISCED 2 f_lower_sec
Father’s upper sec. Ed. 0 1 1 if completed ISCED 3A,3B,3C or 4 f_upper_sec
Father’s tertiary Ed. 0 1 1 if completed ISCED 5B or higher f_ter
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations.
24Table 2: Weighted means and standard deviations
Finland Estonia Czech R. Hungary
Variable Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
scorereading 548.50 75.86 506.68 80.18 484.87 105.76 483.31 90.05
scoremath 550.26 75.15 516.48 75.80 511.14 98.41 491.81 86.84
scorescience 565.56 80.66 533.55 79.67 514.21 94.84 504.71 84.70
Dmale 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.52 0.50
age_m 187.77 3.40 189.66 3.44 190.53 3.43 188.49 3.43
grade7 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.14
grade8 0.11 0.32 0.25 0.44 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.23
grade9 0.89 0.32 0.70 0.46 0.44 0.50 0.66 0.47
grade1011 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.52 0.50 0.27 0.44
book1 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24
book2 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
book3 0.34 0.48 0.29 0.45 0.35 0.48 0.28 0.45
book4 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41
book5 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39
book6 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.37
m_nosec 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09
m_lower_sec 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.14 0.35
m_upper_sec 0.33 0.47 0.62 0.49 0.77 0.42 0.57 0.50
m_ter 0.58 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.45
f_nosec 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.07
f_lower_sec 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.29
f_upper_sec 0.42 0.49 0.77 0.42 0.76 0.43 0.68 0.47
f_ter 0.43 0.50 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.42
Number of obs. 4609 4703 5813 4395
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations.
25Table 2 - continued: Weighted means and standard deviations
Latvia Slovakia Bulgaria Romania
Variable Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
scorereading 481.09 84.09 467.35 99.67 405.52 110.95 396.02 86.35
scoremath 487.98 77.43 493.07 89.85 415.70 95.60 414.92 79.31
scorescience 491.63 80.02 489.41 89.49 436.63 102.63 418.37 77.68
Dmale 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50
age_m 189.61 3.42 188.64 3.38 188.87 3.42 188.91 3.31
grade7 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.08
grade8 0.16 0.37 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.25 0.14 0.34
grade9 0.79 0.41 0.38 0.49 0.74 0.44 0.83 0.38
grade1011 0.03 0.17 0.59 0.49 0.19 0.39 0.03 0.17
book1 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.36
book2 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41
book3 0.31 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47
book4 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36
book5 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30
book6 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24
m_nosec 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.16
m_lower_sec 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.21 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29
m_upper_sec 0.69 0.46 0.81 0.40 0.59 0.49 0.54 0.50
m_ter 0.29 0.45 0.15 0.36 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.48
f_nosec 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.16
f_lower_sec 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25
f_upper_sec 0.77 0.42 0.82 0.39 0.74 0.44 0.60 0.49
f_ter 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.30 0.46
Number of obs. 4542 4675 4255 5102
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations.
Table 3: The share of observations out of the common support
Country 1 Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Estonia Czech
Country 2 Estonia Czech R. Hungary Latvia Slovakia Bulgaria Romania Latvia Slovakia
Country 1 0.63% 0.00% 0.05% 1.23% 0.00% 1.43% 1.49% 0.02% 0.24%
Country 2 2.62% 47.95% 23.68% 2.39% 49.74% 15.39% 2.75% 0.04% 0.07%
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations.
26Table 4: Semiparametric Decomposition Result for Science
Countries 1 c r cr 0 
FIN-EST  0:03 13:30 20:67  2:51 0:58 32:02
(0.21) (2.73) (3.12) (3.78) (0.96) (1.73)
FIN-CZE 0:00 0:37 63:37 4:16  16:55 51:35
(0.09) (4.73) (3.03) (4.81) (1.54) (1.99)
FIN-HUN  0:06  8:07 64:56 12:80  8:37 60:85
(0.15) (3.60) (2.52) (3.81) (1.06) (1.79)
FIN-LTV  0:11 7:55 58:50 8:72  0:72 73:94
(0.15) (2.46) (2.97) (3.39) (0.86) (1.82)
FIN-SLK 0:00  18:65 72:74 27:07  5:00 76:15
(0.22) (7.61) (5.18) (8.15) (3.91) (1.89)
FIN-BUL  0:21 20:79 116:60  6:21  2:04 128:94
(0.26) (3.89) (2.61) (3.81) (1.30) (2.00)
FIN-ROM 0:21 11:86 136:76  0:78  0:86 147:20
(0.21) (1.73) (1.94) (1.86) (0.39) (1.96)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
Table 5: Semiparametric Decomposition Result for Reading
Countries 1 c r cr 0 
FIN-EST  0:11 6:05 33:49 4:70 0:70 44:82
(0.19) (3.39) (3.39) (4.39) (1.05) (1.70)
FIN-CZE 0:00 2:57 77:47 1:58  17:98 63:64
(0.09) (5.46) (3.44) (5.70) (1.76) (2.12)
FIN-HUN  0:06  9:30 71:15 14:15  10:75 65:19
(0.18) (3.93) (3.00) (4.47) (1.22) (1.85)
FIN-LTV  0:07 9:15 54:50 4:37  0:53 67:41
(0.14) (3.03) (3.19) (3.93) (1.03) (1.85)
FIN-SLK 0:00  23:42 86:97 25:95  8:34 81:15
(0.23) (8.41) (4.32) (8.10) (4.79) (1.99)
FIN-BUL  0:18 20:89 130:84  5:31  3:26 142:98
(0.27) (4.33) (2.65) (4.17) (1.43) (2.11)
FIN-ROM 0:09 10:09 141:48 1:58  0:75 152:49
(0.17) (2.08) (2.13) (2.27) (0.41) (1.95)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
27Table 6: Semiparametric decompositions for science between Eastern European countries
Countries 1 c r cr 0 
EST-LTV  0:03  0:30 44:33  2:04  0:04 41:92
(0.05) (1.84) (2.09) (2.10) (0.05) (1.97)
CZE-SLK  0:16 4:35 36:50  15:94 0:05 24:80
(0.20) (2.81) (3.79) (4.44) (0.20) (2.05)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
Table 7: Semiparametric decompositions for reading between Eastern European countries
Countries 1 c r cr 0 
EST-LTV  0:04  0:63 25:36  2:07  0:03 22:59
(0.06) (2.03) (2.13) (2.19) (0.06) (1.99)
CZE-SLK  0:16 2:93 29:57  14:87 0:04 17:51
(0:21) (3.45) (4.30) (5.27) (0.17) (2.33)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
28Table 8: Semiparametric decomposition at di￿erent quantiles for science score
5 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 95 %
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
1 0:20 0:02  0:05 0:00  0:25








c 120:15 53:82 12:28  31:49  82:66
(7:87) (3:28) (2:31) (2:87) (39:97)
r 87:03 57:53 23:09  11:40  65:36
(13:77) (3:96) (3:00) (4:49) (23:92)
cr  180:42  80:21  1:99 74:97 178:52
(15:24) (4:84) (3:47) (5:04) (45:99)
0 1:27 1:16 0:91  0:20  0:38
(1:13) (0:46) (0:42) (0:43) (0:57)
 28.23 32.32 34.24 31.88 29.86
(4:59) (2:62) (2:20) (2:34) (3:23)
1 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00








c  0:94 27:10 7:14  12:59  47:25
(15:25) (7:65) (4:28) (8:40) (17:61)
r 172:90 114:43 62:56 17:06  43:22
(9:61) (7:13) (4:83) (5:24) (12:02)
cr  85:98  59:38 0:88 53:15 131:31
(17:16) (11:49) (5:70) (11:06) (23:27)
0  16:95  17:35  18:65  16:72  11:36
(3:70) (2:24) (2:02) (2:06) (2:33)
 69.03 64.80 51.94 40.90 29.49
(4:66) (2:88) (2:50) (2:53) (3:22)
1  0:02  0:06  0:09  0:07  0:10








c 13:87 31:38  2:11  35:43  69:45
(15:78) (3:62) (3:04) (4:39) (14:25)
r 185:75 118:46 64:57 10:05  62:71
(10:14) (3:03) (2:75) (2:40) (5:29)
cr  130:52  73:75 8:96 89:63 190:26
(18:19) (4:04) (3:47) (4:70) (15:21)
0  10:36  10:07  8:92  6:51  5:34
(2:75) (1:29) (1:10) (1:06) (1:73)
 58.72 65.96 62.42 57.67 52.65
(4:24) (2:65) (2:41) (2:21) (3:08)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
29Table 8 - continued: Semiparametric decomposition at di￿erent quantiles for science score
5 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 95 %
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
1 0:25  0:03  0:20 0:00  0:47








c 99:59 57:31 8:52  38:96  104:62
(14:33) (2:36) (1:91) (2:41) (5:91)
r 111:53 105:53 67:32 26:51  34:02
(15:34) (3:10) (2:79) (3:26) (8:38)
cr  140:44  87:40 0:71 88:08 210:35
(20:81) (3:74) (2:99) (3:80) (10:35)
0 0:56  0:42  0:95  0:94  0:91
(2:21) (0:30) (0:46) (0:54) (0:81)
 71.49 74.99 75.41 74.68 70.33
(4:63) (2:65) (2:48) (2:43) (3:07)
1 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00








c 19:55 11:31  10:74  47:05  74:78
(17:27) (7:51) (5:10) (6:26) (19:56)
r 210:98 126:13 65:08 16:13  52:78
(12:74) (3:52) (3:83) (5:84) (7:16)
cr  127:68  43:44 28:27 97:88 187:33
(20:66) (8:01) (5:84) (8:23) (20:72)
0  18:00  9:09  4:36 1:02 1:39
(4:40) (1:97) (1:86) (1:91) (2:60)
 84.86 84.90 78.26 67.97 61.16
(4:48) (2:41) (2:40) (2:68) (3:06)
1  0:19  0:23  0:24  0:08  0:30








c 69:93 82:82 34:75  16:45  77:63
(16:56) (3:71) (3:07) (3:78) (8:25)
r 240:84 165:15 120:51 69:51  16:64
(7:46) (3:19) (3:67) (3:88) (6:85)
cr  152:62  94:49  16:60 61:73 181:73
(17:82) (4:55) (3:61) (4:57) (10:42)
0  4:52  2:15  2:07  1:75  2:02
(1:17) (0:72) (1:15) (1:33) (1:62)
 153.43 151.11 136.35 112.96 85.14
(3:99) (2:56) (3:23) (2:96) (3:52)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
30Table 8 - continued: Semiparametric decomposition at di￿erent quantiles for science score
5 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 95 %
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
1 0:15 0:13 0:43 0:23 0:08








c 85:42 59:58 20:62  25:91  97:81
(5:52) (5:28) (4:12) (3:05) (4:40)
r 219:61 181:27 137:32 105:60 31:57
(5:88) (5:72) (4:55) (3:44) (3:77)
cr  174:57  91:10  4:73 72:59 210:87
(7:74) (5:84) (4:49) (3:56) (6:00)
0  0:75  0:95  1:10  1:02  0:79
(0:58) (0:61) (0:40) (0:45) (0:61)
 129.85 148.94 152.54 151.48 143.92
(4:01) (5:55) (4:43) (3:61) (3:67)
1 0:00  0:01  0:03  0:04  0:05








c 66:80 37:99 1:67  32:43  77:75
(6:94) (2:79) (2:16) (2:81) (6:89)
r 122:22 79:25 40:50 7:81  34:44
(6:73) (3:26) (2:72) (3:35) (7:27)
cr  148:17  74:07  0:68 67:42 152:75
(9:96) (3:86) (3:04) (4:22) (10:27)
0  0:07  0:04  0:07  0:05  0:02
(0:10) (0:08) (0:06) (0:05) (0:10)
 40.77 43.12 41.40 42.72 40.49
(4:46) (3:00) (2:42) (2:47) (3:39)
1  0:19  0:21  0:21  0:04 0:00








c 93:03 50:75 3:37  42:75  83:00
(12:19) (3:70) (2:84) (3:90) (9:38)
r 89:51 73:68 34:75 2:43  25:36
(13:56) (4:55) (3:61) (4:70) (15:70)
cr  165:86  107:56  12:76 68:95 143:33
(18:15) (5:56) (3:96) (6:02) (18:15)
0 0:06 0:12 0:01 0:05 0:08
(0:44) (0:23) (0:41) (0:55) (0:39)
 16.56 16.78 25.16 28.64 35.04
(4:32) (3:02) (2:91) (2:83) (3:32)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
31Table 9: Semiparametric decomposition at di￿erent quantiles for reading score
5 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 95 %
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
1 0:20  0:07  0:18  0:09  0:28








c 111:28 44:43 4:76  32:00  69:47
(17:78) (3:40) (2:45) (3:42) (23:69)
r 84:08 62:08 34:97 5:54  25:17
(15:53) (4:53) (3:15) (4:85) (20:80)
cr  147:95  61:72 4:15 68:55 138:30
(23:28) (5:57) (3:62) (5:73) (32:57)
0 2:20 2:02 0:83  0:52  1:22
(1:14) (0:40) (0:48) (0:50) (0:38)
 49.81 46.74 44.53 41.49 42.14
(3:97) (2:61) (2:06) (2:26) (2:86)
1 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00








c 13:33 33:97 4:24  13:46  30:95
(28:21) (7:88) (4:66) (8:46) (18:15)
r 184:74 118:98 76:01 32:99  33:29
(11:03) (8:25) (4:48) (5:46) (9:45)
cr  69:25  50:63 2:22 39:84 103:96
(29:84) (11:88) (5:55) (11:42) (22:07)
0  12:54  18:51  22:54  18:46  13:94
(4:39) (2:72) (2:29) (2:02) (2:10)
 116.28 83.81 59.93 40.90 25.78
(4:47) (3:24) (2:46) (2:47) (3:02)
1 0:00  0:05  0:08  0:08  0:11








c 29:83 29:96  7:59  40:05  62:11
(20:17) (3:76) (3:24) (4:54) (13:99)
r 162:08 107:00 63:77 31:42  8:74
(10:56) (4:00) (3:43) (3:78) (10:89)
cr  89:52  49:18 14:90 71:63 132:83
(21:85) (4:91) (4:04) (5:70) (17:47)
0  16:49  13:43  9:74  7:69  7:60
(4:45) (1:36) (1:29) (0:97) (1:37)
 85.88 74.30 61.26 55.23 54.25
(5:29) (2:96) (2:37) (2:17) (2:94)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
32Table 9 - continued: Semiparametric decomposition at di￿erent quantiles for reading score
5 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 95 %
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
1 0:40  0:04  0:10  0:11  0:51








c 90:80 45:36 7:09  24:76  68:68
(17:15) (2:96) (2:01) (2:86) (6:91)
r 124:80 86:67 59:75 23:42  15:06
(17:11) (3:92) (3:00) (3:70) (13:05)
cr  133:95  56:44  0:35 63:30 141:88
(23:73) (5:06) (3:41) (4:57) (14:90)
0 0:98  0:45  1:16  0:92  1:05
(1:93) (0:26) (0:55) (0:36) (0:56)
 83.03 75.09 65.24 60.93 56.59
(4:90) (2:83) (2:28) (2:29) (3:31)
1 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00








c 37:37 9:11  19:09  59:22  83:36
(21:76) (6:64) (5:25) (6:04) (12:27)
r 213:63 126:30 81:90 40:37  28:52
(13:29) (5:97) (5:27) (6:99) (16:71)
cr  108:87  25:10 24:15 82:55 156:37
(24:43) (8:62) (7:12) (8:96) (20:51)
0  16:20  11:41  9:85  1:36 3:64
(5:46) (2:08) (1:68) (1:82) (2:44)
 125.93 98.91 77.10 62.34 48.12
(5:12) (2:77) (2:39) (2:33) (3:35)
1 0:07  0:07  0:31  0:10  0:56








c 83:68 76:64 29:73  25:46  78:47
(16:61) (4:60) (3:35) (3:90) (8:71)
r 259:55 188:08 125:96 78:28 14:06
(10:00) (3:39) (3:86) (3:13) (6:65)
cr  146:24  88:51  8:63 65:31 151:56
(18:39) (5:18) (3:76) (4:54) (10:90)
0  6:48  3:91  3:04  2:24  1:93
(1:28) (1:09) (1:13) (1:20) (1:43)
 190.58 172.23 143.70 115.80 84.66
(4:12) (2:97) (3:24) (2:61) (3:53)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
33Table 9 - continued: Semiparametric decomposition at di￿erent quantiles for reading score
5 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 95 %
Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
1 0:07 0:15 0:05 0:03  0:03








c 106:15 51:35 11:05  32:43  87:21
(5:89) (6:95) (5:25) (3:33) (5:50)
r 232:79 181:61 139:07 103:78 49:19
(6:97) (7:48) (5:90) (3:98) (8:03)
cr  171:97  69:02 4:00 73:40 174:97
(8:64) (7:87) (5:88) (4:45) (9:73)
0  0:40  1:00  1:24  0:43  0:49
(0:82) (0:70) (0:38) (0:34) (0:47)
 166.64 163.10 152.93 144.35 136.43
(3:71) (7:24) (5:78) (3:70) (3:89)
1  0:01  0:03  0:04  0:05  0:07








c 67:58 32:44  4:55  31:02  68:96
(7:61) (2:91) (2:21) (2:84) (7:63)
r 115:33 60:45 18:62  13:99  47:87
(6:64) (3:40) (2:90) (3:37) (6:53)
cr  151:71  64:17 7:59 63:95 132:73
(10:64) (4:02) (3:16) (4:24) (10:51)
0  0:07  0:03  0:05  0:03 0:00
(0:10) (0:10) (0:07) (0:07) (0:16)
 31.12 28.65 21.56 18.86 15.82
(5:30) (3:11) (2:55) (2:53) (2:59)
1  0:02  0:26  0:30  0:12 0:08








c 106:80 47:36  1:11  47:88  84:15
(14:10) (4:69) (3:19) (4:17) (10:92)
r 86:33 63:07 27:75  5:72  26:51
(21:60) (5:57) (4:08) (4:77) (13:96)
cr  177:56  99:39  10:43 77:19 135:53
(25:88) (6:53) (4:44) (6:35) (17:45)
0 0:05 0:13 0:02 0:02 0:06
(0:45) (0:35) (0:48) (0:48) (0:45)
 15.60 10.91 15.93 23.50 25.00
(5:85) (3:90) (3:19) (3:09) (3:33)
Source: PISA 2006 data, own calculations. The country which has worse performance is always the reference country.
Standard errors are in brackets and simulated with 1000 bootstrap replications.
34Table 10: Autonomy and in-service teacher training
Finland Estonia Czech R. Hungary
Dates of major reforms that have progressively
1992 1990 1993
increased the school autonomy a implemented
Dates of major reforms that have progressively
1990 2004 1993
increased the curricular autonomy b implemented
School autonomy regarding
hiring teachersa delegation c possible full full limited
operating expenditures (salaries) a delegation possible full limited limited
the content of the compulsory minimum curriculum b limited full full limited
the curricular content of optional subjects b limited full full limited
the choice of teaching methods b full full full full
the choice of school textbooks b delegation possible limited d full full
the criteria for the internal assessment of pupils b full full full full
decisions as to whether pupils should repeat a year b full full full full
In-service teacher training a
Status of in-service teacher training compulsory compulsory compulsory compulsory
Amount of time per year (in hours) 18 32 no time indication 17
Incentives no incentives promotion salary increase salary increase
aSource: Eurydice (2007)
bSource: Eurydice (2008)
cDelegation means that bodies or local authorities may delegate their decision-making power to schools.
dTeachers choose the textbooks from a predetermined list.
35Table 10 - continued: Autonomy and in-service teacher training
Latvia Slovak R. Bulgaria Romania
Dates of major reforms that have
1991 1990 2008 2006
increased the school autonomy a
Dates of major reforms that have
1993 1990 - 1998
increased the curricular autonomy b
School autonomy regarding
hiring teachers a full full full no autonomy
operating expenditures (salaries) a full limited no autonomy no autonomy
the content of the compulsory minimum curriculum b no autonomy no autonomy no autonomy no autonomy
the curricular content of optional subjects b limited full limited full
the choice of teaching methods b full full full full
the choice of school textbooks b limited c limited full limited
the criteria for the internal assessment of pupils b limited full full full
decisions as to whether pupils should repeat a year b no autonomy full full full
In-service teacher training a
Status of in-service teacher training compulsory optional compulsory compulsory
Amount of time per year (in hours) 36 no time indication no time indication 19




cTeachers choose the textbooks from a predetermined list.
Table 11: Accountability
External exams a Tracking c
for promotion, for monitoring School years in which Number of school
streaming schools they take place programs b
Finland - X (1998 d) 6,9 1
Estonia X (1997) X (1997) 9 1
Czech R. - - - 6
Hungary - X (1986) 4,6,8 4
Latvia X (1994) X (1994) 3,6,9 2
Slovak R. - X (2003) 9 6
Bulgaria - X (2006) 4,5,6 4
Romania X (2007) X (1995) 7,8 3
aSource: Eurydice (2009)
bSource: PISA 2006 Database
cWe use the school programs, in which the students are enrolled, as proxies for school types.
dYear of ￿rst full implementation of external exams (national tests).
36